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The Parapraxis 
of Translation
R o l a n d  V é g s ő
University of Nebraska, Lincoln
What happens to the theory of translation in an age when philoso-
phy no longer considers language to be the ultimate horizon of being, yet 
reality constantly confronts us with situations that prove on a daily basis 
the urgency of translation? Whereas the former tendency might disorient 
our thinking with relation to translation, the second relentlessly reminds us 
of its inescapable necessity. It is this state of aff airs that has led many of us 
to believe that translation has finally and irrevocably entered the domain 
of global politics.1 But in its subtle yet decisive move away from a certain 
conception of language, philosophy did not simply abandon us. If we are 
willing to learn from current philosophical inquiries into the meaning of the 
political, eventually we might have to consider the hypothesis that transla-
tion is not merely the infinite production of meaning between languages but 
a practice oriented by truth. In fact, one of the most important provocations 
off ered by contemporary philosophy for the theory of translation is precisely 
its revaluation of the category of truth.2 Th ese are the questions, then, that 
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we need to consider in some detail here: Is it possible to speak about transla-
tion in terms other than those of “meaning”? Or, more importantly, is it really 
possible to speak about translation today in terms of “truth” without falling 
into the trap of the most banal forms of reactionary essentialism?
Since psychoanalysis is one of the most prominent theoretical discourses 
that have always insisted on the diff erence between truth and knowledge, 
we will start here by evoking a well-known moment of its history involving a 
significant act of translation. My argument is the following: James Strachey’s 
invention of the term “parapraxis” sometime around 1916 constitutes an event 
of translation. For us, the ultimate significance of this event lies in the fact 
that it allows us to define translation itself as a form of parapraxis. Th rough 
this event, an excessive act of translation—that goes beyond the original as 
well as the intentions of the translator—gave us a new name for translation 
itself. It was once again the very practice of translation that contained in 
itself the conditions of its own theorization. It is up to us now to complete 
this theoretical task belatedly.3
Th is discussion of the parapraxis of translation, however, must first be 
prefaced by a brief look at the historical act of translation. Strachey explained 
himself in the introduction to Alan Tyson’s translation of Th e Psychopathol-
ogy of Everyday Life in the following terms: “In German Fehlleistung, ‘faulty 
function.’ It is a curious fact that before Freud wrote this book the general 
concept seems not to have existed in psychology, and in English a new word 
had to be invented to cover it” (1960, 5 n. 3). Strachey’s explanation suggests 
that his translation is intended to render the novelty of a conceptual innova-
tion visible in translation. His translation, therefore, proceeds through two 
steps. First, one could say that he invents an invention. He has to make an 
argument that a specific form of conceptual innovation took place without 
precedent in the original. Second, he himself invents a new word to designate 
the new concept. Th e question has long been whether this second step was 
actually necessary or not.
Th e point, however, is that Strachey’s invention cannot be derived from 
any of the available elements of the situation. On the one hand, it is not 
clear why the German original would demand an innovation on the lexical 
level in English. On the other hand, it is not clear why this innovation has 
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to assume the specific form of a Greek rather than an English neologism. So 
Strachey’s reinvention of a Freudian invention cannot be logically derived 
either from the source nor the target language. It is in this sense that the 
term “parapraxis” remains a “pure” invention.
In his famous attack on the Standard Edition, Bruno Bettelheim has 
criticized Freud’s English translators for their consistent and politically moti-
vated eff orts to inscribe psychoanalysis in contemporary medical discourse, 
when in reality, so Bettelheim argued, the late Freud was essentially using 
the language of the humanities and not that of the sciences. Of course, we all 
understand Bettelheim’s point that translation shows us its uglier face when 
the simple German word for the “I” (das Ich) is translated into English by way 
of the Latin equivalent and becomes “the ego.” But to make sense of what 
is happing in the Standard Edition, let us take two further examples from 
Bettelheim’s book, Freud and Man’s Soul (1983): parapraxis and the drive.
Bettelheim’s spirited invective against Freud’s translators reaches one 
of its cruel climaxes when he picks up the Psychopathology of Everyday Life 
(1960 [1901]). Th is is the moment when “parapraxis” enters the stage. We must 
note that Bettelheim is sensitive to the self-reflexive ironies of a mistransla-
tion that concerns a concept that happens to name a failed performance: 
“Th e very topic of the book, one would think, ought to have alerted them to 
their own propensity to mistranslate out of subconscious motives” (1983, 82). 
Not surprisingly, it is precisely the failure of this translation that proves the 
truth of the Freudian text—the failure of the translation is the result of the 
nefarious intervention of the unconscious into the act of translation itself. 
Bettelheim does not waste his time in pointing out that the very translation 
of Fehlleistung turned out to be a rather unfortunate kind of Fehlleistung. 
Presumably, then, the problem with “parapraxis” is that it is a mistranslation 
“out of subconscious motives” that hides the very truth it embodies.
But the path struck by this metaphor cannot be followed too long, as 
the point is precisely that the mistranslation not only fails on the formal 
level, but that it cannot reproduce the content of the original concept either: 
“Th e translation is wrong also because it gives the impression that an ac-
tion was intended but clumsily executed, when often no action whatsoever 
was intended” (Bettelheim 1983, 86). Bettelheim’s criticism, however, is not 
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to be underestimated, and we should indeed listen to him when he adds: 
“What happens in Fehlleistung is simultaneously—albeit on diff erent levels 
of consciousness—a real achievement and a howling mistake” (86). “A real 
achievement and a howling mistake”—this should indeed convince us that 
we are now talking about translation.
Close to the end of the book, Bettelheim takes up another similar term: 
der Trieb. When Strachey tried to defend his decision to translate der Trieb 
as “instinct,” he argued that “drive” was not a noun but a verb in English. 
Needless to say, this apology merely provides Bettelheim with another reason 
to relish the irony of the situation: “Th e notion that ‘drive’ is not an English 
noun is not very convincing, coming from translators who have created such 
terms as ‘parapraxis’ and ‘scopophilia.’ Its obvious merit can be seen in the 
fact that in recent years it has become standard American usage. According 
to Webster’s, ‘drive’ is both a noun and a verb” (1983, 104). Of course, it is 
useless to fight irony with irony, but let us point out immediately that the 
word “parapraxis” itself is now included in the most respectable dictionaries 
of the English language.
Th us, we have in front of us two complementary examples. When Strachey 
mistranslates “drive” as “instinct,” he follows the standards of an imaginary 
linguistic conservatism (“there is no such noun in English!”), and fails to 
recognize the conceptual innovation inherent in Freud’s argument. He do-
mesticates psychoanalytic thought—but the history of the English language 
proves him wrong as it itself embraces the unwanted innovation. Th is we 
shall not consider an event of translation. On the other hand, in the case of 
“parapraxis,” we encounter the exact opposite. When Strachey mistranslates 
Fehlleistung as “parapraxis,” he intervenes in the target language in a way 
that itself will be canonized by linguistic usage. But what counts for us is not 
Strachey’s intention—but the excessive eff ects of his parapraxis.4
T h e  P a r a d o x a  o f  T r a n s l a t i o n
Although Strachey had a translated word but did not apply it to the theory 
of translation, in the shadow of this event another argument has been hiding 
on the margins of the standard canons of modernist translation theory. Two 
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decades after the invention of the term “parapraxis,” José Ortega y Gasset 
defined translation in terms that seem to lack nothing but the actual name 
“parapraxis.” So whereas Strachey had a word without a corresponding 
theory of translation, Ortega y Gasset had a conceptual framework without 
an appropriate name. Th e diff erence between the two authors shows us that 
“parapraxis” is an absent center of modernist theories of translation.
In his 1937 essay, which bears the eloquent title “Th e Misery and the 
Splendor of Translation,” Ortega y Gasset puts on his banner the revolution-
ary motto: “Translation is dead! Long live translation!” (1992, 97) He puts 
forth the argument that human praxis is constitutively impossible and, 
therefore, utopian: “Isn’t the act of translating necessarily a utopian task? Th e 
truth is, I’ve become more and more convinced that everything Man does is 
utopian” (93). And “the utopianism of translation” (96) is sustained by two 
contradictory forces: on the one hand, translation must change language; at 
the same time, it must remain intelligible. So translation is an impossible 
utopian human praxis precisely because it is always in excess of human 
intentions. Th is is why it is a parapraxis—a praxis without identity that will 
only gain any semblance of identity retroactively from the perspective of its 
own excessive eff ects.
In fact, Ortega y Gasset makes it absolutely clear that parapraxis is the 
foundation of the historicity of the human being:
World history compels us to recognize Man’s continuous, inexhaustible 
capacity to invent unrealizable projects. In the eff ort to realize them, he 
achieves many things, he creates innumerable realities that so-called Nature 
is incapable of producing for itself. Th e only thing that Man does not achieve 
is, precisely, what he proposes to—let it be said to his credit. Th is wedding of 
reality with the demon of what is impossible supplies the universe with the 
only growth it is capable of. For that reason, it is very important to emphasize 
that everything—that is, everything worthwhile, everything truly human—is 
difficult, very difficult; so much so, that it is impossible. (1992, 99)
Th is impossible production of history is, then, the real task of parapraxis. Th e 
human being invents essentially unrealizable projects. In the course of the 
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practical realization of these projects, however, what is achieved is always 
something other than what was intended. Th is excess of the unintended ef-
fect over the practical intention is history itself as the result of parapraxis. 
Th e conclusion is clear: if there were only praxis without parapraxis, history 
would cease to exist.
Although Ortega y Gasset does not have the word at his disposal, he 
explicitly comes to the brink of defining translation as “parapraxis.” As we 
have seen, the conceptual apparatus that he employs already suggests such 
a nomination, but lacking the invented word in his original Spanish, he re-
treats to the safety of an already available option. In a crucial passage of the 
text, he defines translation as “para-doxa” instead of “para-praxis”: “Doesn’t it 
seem more likely that the intellectual [in this case, also the translator] exists 
in order to oppose public opinion, the doxa, by revealing and maintaining 
a front against the commonplace with true opinion, the paradoxa?” (1992, 
101). Th ese passages devoted to the paradox of translation remove transla-
tion from the field of doxa (mere opinion). Th e new location of translation, 
however, is not simply a metaphysical conception of “truth” but the mere 
interruption of the popular discourse of doxa by a “true opinion.” Th e ap-
parently oxymoronic expression, “true opinion,” also speaks of a reluctance 
to simply oppose truth to opinion and off ers us a way out of their barren 
oppositions. But this description clearly follows the general structure of the 
Freudian parapraxis: intellectual praxis produces paradoxa. On the one hand, 
for Ortega y Gasset, translation is an impossible utopian praxis without a 
predetermined identity, which produces unintended results. On the other 
hand, translation as paradoxa is a truth event that interrupts the regular flow 
of discourse without claiming for itself the status of a transcendental truth.
As a result, classical figures for understanding the process of translation 
no longer suffice. Most importantly, for Ortega y Gasset, translation is not 
an act of interpretation that simply aims at repeating the original in a new 
language. In place of repetition and transfer, he off ers us the metaphor of 
division. Since “a repetition of the work is impossible,” translation divides the 
original work: “For that reason, it will be necessary to divide the work and 
make divergent translations of the same work according to the facets of it 
that we may wish to translate with precision” (1992, 110). Th e original work, 
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in this sense, becomes a surface of diff erences, which invites the translator’s 
intervention to establish new constellations between unfixed elements in 
dynamic relations with each other.
But this division is more than just a metaphor for translation. In fact, 
with the figure of division, we have entered the domain we might call “the 
metaphysics of the subject”:
Th e fact is that the world surrounding Man has never been definable in un-
equivocal articulations. Or said more clearly, the world, such as we find it, is 
not composed of “things” definitively separated and frankly diff erent. We find 
in it infinite diff erences, but these diff erences are not absolute. Strictly speak-
ing, everything is diff erent from everything else, but also everything looks 
somewhat like everything else. Reality is a limitless continuum of diversity. 
In order not to get lost in it, we have to slice it, portion it out, and separate 
the parts; in short, we have to allocate an absolute character to diff erentia-
tions that actually are only relative. For that reason Goethe said that things 
are diff erences that we establish. Th e first action that Man has taken in his 
intellectual confrontation with the world is to classify the phenomena, to 
divide what he finds before him into classes. To each one of these classes is 
attributed a signifier for his voice, and this is language. But the world off ers us 
innumerable classifications, and does not impose any on us. Th at being the 
case, each people must carve up the volatile part of the world in a diff erent 
way, must make a diff erent incision, and for that reason there are such diverse 
languages with diff erent grammars and vocabularies and semantics. Th at 
original classification is the first supposition to have been made about what 
the truth of the world is; it was, therefore, the first knowledge. Here is the 
reason why, as a principle, speaking was knowing. (Ortega y Gasset 1992, 107)
Th e world itself is composed of infinite diff erences. But to make sense of these 
diff erences, we need to introduce yet another layer of diff erences. Division, 
therefore, is the primary praxis that accounts for the very emergence of the 
subject through its first historical act. We could even say that it is the praxis 
that functions as the very condition of all practical engagement of the world, 
a proto-praxis that in itself remains unaccounted for in Ortega y Gasset’s 
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text. But since division is the ur-praxis that precedes any other praxis, the 
birth of language itself is explained here as a division introduced into a world 
of infinite diff erences. And if division accounts for the very constitution of 
language, it is also responsible for translation. Division is the primary act of 
translation that once turned ontological diff erence into language. As such, 
the mundane work of translation now appears as the repetition of the foun-
dational act of the speaking subject on a diff erent level, as a redistribution 
of the divisions of language.
Still following the inherent direction of Ortega y Gasset’s arguments, then, 
we could argue that division, as the paradoxical practical origin of praxis in 
general, divides praxis itself. No praxis can ever possess a full identity, since 
it always necessarily relies on this earlier praxis (that he does not account 
for in his work). And this is how we could define “parapraxis”: it is divided 
praxis, and as such, it is a self-dividing division of the other (the world of 
infinite diff erences).
But a crucial metaphysical limitation of Ortega y Gasset’s argument sur-
faces here in that he clearly posits an original authentic relation to language 
that was corrupted by history. Today, as he reminds us, language is “a mere 
joke” (1992, 106). Th e historical destiny of man was such that we forgot the 
original divisions instituted by language, and therefore we no longer mean 
what we say. Th e discovery of this historical alienation from the original divi-
sion of the world by language leads Ortega y Gasset to the conclusion that 
“our languages are anachronisms” (108). Th e problem of this authenticity, 
however, leaves us with a new question: is it possible to conceive of transla-
tion in such a way that we avoid the trap of a certain kind of relativism (ac-
cording to which every translation would be equally valid) without reference 
to an authentic origin?
Let us, then, consider the following historical constellation: Freud, 
Strachey, and Ortega y Gasset. Freud invents a concept; Ortega y Gasset in-
vents a theory of translation; and Strachey invents a name. Th e connections 
between the concept, the theory, and the name are only visible from the point 
of view of posterity. Th is is why we are dealing with an event of translation: 
in the immanence of the situation called “modernist translation theory,” the 
connections between the three were impossible to establish in the terms I 
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have outlined here. Strictly speaking, the value of Strachey’s mistranslation 
remains undecidable in the situation.
T h e  P r a g m a t i c s  o f  T r a n s l a t i o n
To explain what the concept of parapraxis can add to our understanding of 
translation, let me break down the proposed meaning of the term in three 
steps. First, it is clear that the choice of the word “parapraxis” allows us to 
answer the difficult question “What is translation?” in a straightforward 
manner: translation is what translators do. To the degree that translation is 
a parapraxis, it is primarily a form of praxis. In other words, the emphasis 
falls on what is being performed in the act of translation. Second, however, 
the prefix indicates that this praxis is not quite praxis: it is located “beside” 
praxis. As a dislocated form of praxis, it happens to be “beside itself,” a praxis 
without a unified identity. Th ird, this inherent lack of identity does not mean 
that it never has any identity whatsoever. Rather, the point is that translation 
is a form of doing that is best understood as the practical interruption of a 
praxis by the unpredictable emergence of an unconscious truth. It is the very 
act of translation that must perform the identity that it possesses.
So what does it mean to do translation? In his Translation and the Na-
ture Philosophy, Andrew Benjamin has provided us a compelling answer 
to this question. From our perspective, the unquestionable significance of 
Benjamin’s argument is that it allows us to describe translation as a praxis 
without an essence: “What is translation? It is both a plurality of activities 
and has a plurality of significations. Th e word ‘translation’ names this plural-
ity and hence the word itself can have no content other than this potentially 
conflicting plurality. Any specific answer to the question—what is it that 
translation is?—must involve a determination of this original diff erence oc-
casioned by the necessity of the pragmatic (which would be, for example, the 
need to make a specific translation)” (1989, 35–36).
We encounter here a number of crucial points that are indispensable for 
any contemporary discussion of translation. First, it must be noted that for 
Benjamin translation itself is not an already given activity but a plurality of 
activities that will gain an ostensible unified identity only when the moment 
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of pragmatic realization arrives. Until we perform an act of translation, we 
do not know what translation is. Yet, even in the moment of its actualiza-
tion (when one particular activity is realized from this original plurality), the 
meaning of the act remains to be determined. Second, we can also see then 
that this practice simultaneously produces the conditions of its own concep-
tualization in the form of a plurality of possible meanings. In other words, 
the praxis of translation theory itself is anchored in the same diff erential 
plurality that constitutes translation. Th us, the irreducible pluralities of what 
translation does and what it means both have their foundations in the same 
ontological determinations. Finally, this complication allows us to redescribe 
the lack of inherent identity of translation in terms of a split between the 
particularity of translation (the pragmatic realization of one single practice 
in a specific translation) and the universality of translation (the answer to the 
question “what is translation”?). In other words, every single act of transla-
tion possesses a split identity in that it is a particular act that at the same 
time produces the universal definition of what translation means.
Th e task ahead of us, then, appears to be to think the possibility of a 
pragmatics that does not fully coincide with itself (what we could also call 
a “para-pragmatics”). At least, this is the direction Benjamin’s arguments 
take when he distinguishes the actual act of translation (what he calls 
pragma) from the primordial inhering of what can never be fully actualized 
in such an act. For translation theory, the most important consequence of 
this distinction is that the sacrosanct status of the “original” is fully under-
mined. It is not a mere accident that in Benjamin’s book it is a reading of 
Freud that prepares the ground for the argument that the original itself is 
devoid of a fully constituted identity (1989, 172). To put it diff erently, since 
the original is never fully self-identical, it becomes a surface of investments 
and reworkings (165). As a result, translation is never a mere reproduction 
of the original. Rather, the point is that translation is constitutive of the 
object of translation (the original). At the same time, the very identity of 
the pragmatic act of translation that constitutes its own object is equally 
undermined by the inhering of what is present but not actualized in the 
act. As an act of presentation, pragma also always presents something other 
than what is actualized in the act.
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Although this point remains underdeveloped in Benjamin’s book, we 
should not underestimate the importance of the fact that he calls this 
pragma (the moment of decision and realization in translation) an “event” 
(1989, 148). What takes place in this event? If we follow Benjamin’s argument, 
we can easily recognize here the logic of Freudian Nachträglichkeit in that 
Benjamin posits the “retrospective production of the preconditions of trans-
lation” (146). On the one hand, a concrete act of translation is realized from 
among the plurality of possibilities. But as we have seen, this realization is 
simultaneously an attempt to define the universality of translation as well. 
At the same time, this universality can only come about if the original is 
redefined as the valid condition of the given translation. Yet when all is said 
and done, the pragmatic self-realization of translation cannot fully erase the 
traces of the excluded possibilities. As such, translation is always haunted by 
an element of alterity. So the following elements have to congeal in the single 
moment of the event: the constitution of the original as the precondition 
of translation, the realization of a concrete translation (the particular), the 
definition of the field of translation (the universal), and the presentation of 
what remains unactualized in the act.
What remains to be done, however, is a more consistent elaboration of 
the relation of these elements. To make the necessary connections, we need 
to return to the parapraxis of translation as a form of fundamental division. 
What is at stake here, then, is the production of the identity of translation 
itself. Th erefore, the fundamental division that concerns us is that between 
the translatable and the untranslatable. In the event of translation, therefore, 
this division receives a concrete form, for every act of translation announces 
the simple fact that translation is possible. Th is possibility, however, needs to 
find its concrete conditions in the original, and at the same time, the particu-
lar translation has to stand in for the universality of translatability. But since 
every act of translation is based on a series of exclusions, the constitutive 
division of translation itself bears witness to an inalienable dimension of 
alterity.
Th is redefinition of the primary pragmatic problem of translation as the 
very institution of the identity of translation by way of a decision concerning 
the division of the translatable and untranslatable also shows us that today 
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we need to avoid two temptations. We could call the first one “the modernist 
temptation,” the second “the postmodernist temptation.” Th e first believes 
in a universal language. Th e most strident examples of this tendency are the 
invention of Esperanto and the early phase of analytic philosophy, which at 
one point in its history, set out on a quest for an “ideal language.” Although 
in a completely diff erent form, we can detect the same tendencies even in the 
works of the most important modernist theoreticians of translation: the idea 
of a universal language animates Ezra Pound’s fascination with Chinese ideo-
grams as well as the historical invention of Esperanto. Th e “postmodernist 
temptation,” on the other hand, in its rejection of universal languages, leads 
us to what we could call the “fetishization of the untranslatable.” If transla-
tion follows the dogmas of this temptation, it can very easily find itself in the 
midst of an insuff erable tautology: it is reduced to the identical repetition of 
what it declares to be the untranslatable.
So when we ask the question if there is anything beyond the opposition of 
a universal language and the fetishization of the untranslatable, we are ask-
ing for the reconsideration of the relation between what is and what is not 
translatable. Let us borrow something from both of these temptations. On 
the one hand, let us accept the fact that untranslatability is an ontologically 
primary fact. On the other hand, however, let us borrow the fiction of the 
universal language—at least in the sense that we declare that translation is 
still possible. In other words, even on a terrain of ontological inconsistency 
(what we could call the primacy of untranslatability), acts of translation are 
possible. Th is is what the phenomenology of translation teaches us. But as a 
primary determination on the level of undecidability, this originary untrans-
latability lacks a true identity.
Th e field of translation (as the field of translatability) comes about as a 
result of a primary exclusion. Th e untranslatable has to be excluded from the 
field of translation to establish what is translatable. But the excluded element 
does not disappear without a trace: the untranslatable constantly threatens 
the normal operation of translation. As the excluded element, the lack of its 
position remains visible in the field from which it has been excluded. Th ere-
fore, the very dividing line (the agent of exclusion) between the translatable 
and the untranslatable becomes unstable (since the untranslatable can show 
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up on either side because of its ontological primacy). Th e conclusion is the 
following: the dividing line itself lacks a substantial identity. But if the very 
separation of what is and what is not translatable has no essential identity, 
this very division becomes a question of practice: the very division between 
the two has to be produced by an act of translation.
In other words, the actual separation of the translatable from the 
untranslatable does not precede the act of translation: it is a retroactive 
construction that coincides with the act of translation. What precedes the 
act is the mere ontological primacy of untranslatability, the mere fact that 
there is something of the untranslatable. But this structural position has no 
inherent positive content. Beyond its mere existence, there is nothing we 
can say about it. Th e separation of the two has no other positive identity 
than what is performed in the very act of translation. Th is tells us that every 
act of translation has a split identity: it is a particular translation, and at 
the same time, it is the very production of the universality of translation (by 
way of a separation of the translatable and the untranslatable). Every act 
must reenact the division of the translatable and the untranslatable. Th is is 
why no “original” possesses the quality of untranslatability in an essential or 
absolute fashion.5
Th is inherent decision concerning the untranslatable, however, proves 
that translation is not interpretation. No doubt, once the field of translat-
ability is instituted, the praxis of translation will appear to us as a form of 
interpretation or as a series of acts of deliberation. Th e image is a familiar 
one: the translator, deeply absorbed in his or her art, weighs a number of 
options, progressively discarding the inadequate solutions until the only ac-
ceptable solution emerges. Th is triumphant narrative, however, collapses 
when it becomes clear that there are not always logical criteria to derive 
one single correct translation. Th ese are the moments when the translator 
needs to choose from several more or less synonymous, more or less equiva-
lent options. Th e crucial moment of translation, then, arrives when logical 
deliberation fails: it becomes clear that translation cannot be defined as a 
mere search for equivalents, as it has to assume the burden of a singular 
intervention. Th ese are the moments when the translator is called upon to 
act in the form of a decision that cannot be fully grounded in logical criteria.
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In fact, this is how we can define “translation theory” as well. Translation 
is a praxis and not a theory. But as a para-praxis, its impossible identity will 
always have to be mediated by another form of praxis that remains external 
to it. Th is is the praxis of translation theory. At the moment when translation 
reaches the limits of interpretation, it finds itself up against the necessity of a 
decision that cannot always be the result of logical deliberation. Th e location 
of translation theory is precisely this gap between deliberation and the act. 
Translation theory is the practice whose goal is to formalize the irreducible 
gap between interpretation and decision, deliberation and the act. Every act 
of translation, to the degree that it makes the leap from deliberation to the 
act, inherently performs its own identity retroactively, and thereby opens up 
the possibility of the retroactive realization of its own theory. In other words, 
translation produces the conditions of its own theorization.
T h e  T r u t h  o f  T r a n s l a t i o n
So what kind of a truth can be produced by translation as parapraxis? 
Th e psychoanalytic model seems to dictate an already familiar scheme: as 
a praxis, translation produces meaning, which is then interrupted by the 
eruption of an unconscious truth through parapraxis. However, the useful-
ness of this approach is obviously quite limited if we allow it to reduce the 
theory of translation to the psychology of the translator. A more generous 
interpretation shifts the focus from the translator’s psyche to the “political 
unconscious” of textual production. In this sense, what counts is the contex-
tual determination of the translator’s practice by social and cultural forces 
beyond his or her conscious control. Accordingly, the truth of translation 
would be a symptom of the historical situation in which translation takes 
place. But even if the act of translation is overdetermined, we need to be 
able to formulate here an affirmative theory of the truth of translation, which 
goes beyond the mere passive suff ering of external determinations.
Th is is why we need to emphasize that when we speak about the “truth” 
of translation, we use “truth” as a political category. In other words, what we 
could call “the politics of translation” consists of the fact that every act of 
translation institutes a partially fixed identity on a terrain of undecidability 
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(since “translation as such” lacks an inherent identity). Th e politics of transla-
tion corresponds to the original division that produces the truth of translation 
as the precarious political universality of translatability. It is simultaneously 
the insistence of the particular act on its own accuracy and the concomitant 
provisional suturing of the very meaning of “translation” as such. Th us, the 
politics of translation is not simply the determination of the translator’s act 
by historical forces, but also the way translation creates its own history out 
of these already given conditions.
We could then say that “truth” is a necessary dimension of every act of 
translation for two reasons. On the one hand, the particular act of transla-
tion cannot be simply logically derived from the original. In the process of 
translation, the translator faces moments of decision that are no longer sim-
ply questions of direct logical equivalence. Th ese moments of decision (and 
division) assume the form of a leap of faith (even if they can be rationalized by 
more or less consistent explanations). On this level, the truth of translation 
is the interpretive institution of the very identity of the original. On the other 
hand, the tragic flaw of even the most modest act of translation is that it 
cannot exist without suggesting that it has discovered something of the truth 
of the original. As we have seen, the inherent truth-claim of every translation 
is also based on the fact that there is an inalienable gap between an inherent 
lack of identity and the irreducible singularity of the act of translation. Th e 
retroactive construction of the truth of the original through a series of deci-
sions cannot be separated from the anticipatory assertion of the universality 
of translatability as the truth of translation in general. Th e important point, 
however, is that these two levels cannot be separated from each other.
Translation, therefore, knots together a number of diff erent elements: the 
ambiguous identity of the original, a praxis without identity, and the divisive 
decision that institutes the truth of translation. Th is is why we should un-
derstand translation as the groundless production of a relation between two 
objects. First, it must be acknowledged that translation is the production of 
an object: the translation. At the same time, it is the production of an object 
in relation to another already existing object: the original. But translation 
does more than merely create a new isolated object. We can speak of the knot 
of praxis precisely because translation should be seen as the simultaneous 
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production of the new object, the relation between the new and the old ob-
jects, as well as the meaning of this relation.
Of course, the difficulty consists of seeing in what sense the original 
itself is also produced by this act. Th e original did not have a material or 
ideological reality prior to the act, which means that the “survival” of the 
original constitutes its identity. We like to think of translation as a form 
of “reproduction,” but this term can be quite misleading. It assumes an 
already finished object that has an identity that can be transposed onto 
another object. But translation is a “reproduction” of the original only in 
the sense that the original remains one of the necessary poles of the rela-
tion produced by translation. A crucial conflict becomes visible here: the 
hypothetical pure objectivity of the original clashes with the testimony of 
the translation that even the original cannot be absolutely pure objectivity. 
Th is is the meaning of the proposition that translation is a “praxis without 
identity.” As a material praxis, translation is a contingent assemblage of 
diverse bodily and textual movements, a loose collection of apparatuses, a 
constellation. Th is praxis, however, also contains the conditions of its own 
conceptualizations. Th us, the role of the subject is to freeze this endless 
production for a passing yet eternal moment in order to attribute mean-
ing and a concrete identity to this groundless production: the task of the 
subject of translation is to declare in a particular situation that a relation 
of production between two objects is in fact called “translation.” It is in this 
sense that translation “happens.”
Needless to say, acts of translation do not occur in a vacuum. If the “poli-
tics of translation” names the institution of the double truth of translation, 
what we could call the “event of translation” forces a break with the doxa of 
the situation. Th e truth of translation (as the intertwined truth of the original 
and the universality of translatability) is always contested by other similar 
truth-claims. At any given moment, a certain set of these claims make up the 
contemporary situation of translation: what is imagined to be possible and 
necessary under the name of “translation” in a concrete historical situation. 
Acts of translation break with the rules of this doxa at the risk of being exiled 
from this world for their abominable monstrosities. Yet, it is this risk that 
constitutes a true event, for it demands a new kind of fidelity.
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Borrowing a few terms from Alain Badiou without going beyond a mere 
formal imitation of his system, we can now condense the theory of transla-
tion as parapraxis into the following four theses:
1. Th e event of translation is undecidable.
2. Th e event of translation gives rise to the subject of translation.
3. Th e event of translation falls within the register of truth and not that 
of meaning.
4. Th e truth of translation points toward something unnamable.6
First, the event of translation remains strictly speaking undecidable. 
When the emergence of a truth event interrupts the praxis of a particular 
doxa, it must remain undecidable whether the event belongs to the situa-
tion or not. Whatever measure we use to decide the value of a translation 
(whether it is “good” or “bad,” “correct” or “incorrect,” and so forth), there 
is an inherent break that separates the praxis of deliberation and interpre-
tation from the event of the actual pragma that institutes one particular 
translation. It is this gap in the very structure of translation that accounts 
for its undecidability: whatever belongs to the situation in such a way that 
it can be deduced logically from existing conditions can also be gathered up 
in the process of deliberation. But the event of translation will be in excess 
of this praxis.
Second, the event of translation induces the emergence of the subject of 
translation that confronts the implacable necessity of a pure choice between 
indiscernible terms. In other words, translation is not interpretation—or 
never wholly interpretation (if by the latter we mean a rational calcula-
tion of available options). Th e subject of translation is therefore opened 
up to a much broader set of identifications. Th is subject is not merely the 
“translator” who is the agent of the decision. Rather, translation initiates an 
open-ended process of historical identifications that includes the original 
( for the claim of the translation is that the very truth of the original is only 
visible to us through the truth of translation), the translator, and the reader 
of the translation as well. All three are off ered a chance here to participate 
in the same process. In an even more abstract sense, we could argue that the 
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subject of translation is comprised of all the finite moments that participate 
in the infinite truth of translation.
Th ird, translation falls within the register of truth and not that of mean-
ing. Th is truth, however, is not the adequation of meaning between the 
original and the translation, but a truthful fidelity to an event. Th is is why 
we can also redefine the meaning of “fidelity.” Th is term no longer designates 
the accurate representation of an original text in a target language. Rather, 
it refers to the constitution of the subject of translation as it persists in its 
devotion to an undecidable event.
We can also identify here a necessary shift of perspective in the temporal-
ity of translation. What is the meaning of “infinity” for translation? On the 
one hand, translation consists of a retroactive constitution of an original 
event; on the other hand, it means the active opening up of a history, an 
infinite future of a truth procedure. Th e infinity of translation, therefore, can 
have two points of reference: the untranslatable and translation itself. Th e 
old definition, without wholly losing its validity, merely posits the infinite 
possibility of new translations. Because of the inherent presence of the un-
translatable, every translation has only a partial identity and is suspect to an 
infinite series of retranslations. On the other hand, however, we also need 
to conceive of the other infinity of a fully achieved translation. We need to 
articulate the opposition between the infinity of untranslatability and the 
infinity of translation. Th e latter puts an end to the synchronic infinity of the 
first by opening up the diachronic infinity of a truth procedure.
Finally, although translation’s infinite truth demands fidelity, the truth 
process points toward something unnamable. Th is is the ethical dimension 
of translation. On the one hand, the politics of translation demands that we 
declare and persist in a fidelity to an undecidable event and anticipate the 
completion of this truth in a fully achieved translation. Th is is what Badiou 
calls “forcing”: “A forcing is the powerful fiction of a completed truth” (2003, 
65). On the other hand, the ethical dimension of translation demands that, 
even in the compulsive nomination that constitutes translation, we remain 
“militants of restrained action” (58) and refrain from forcing the unnamable, 
what we could call “the real of translation.” Th us, the powerful fiction of the 
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fully achieved truth of translation orients the subject of translation in its 
infinite process of faithful verification.
Th e metaphysics of translation reaches here a turning point in its mel-
ancholy history. We must remember that what was metaphysical in classic 
translation theory was not that it believed in the possibility of translation, 
but that it founded the translatable on an essentialized concept of the un-
translatable. Th e traces of this theology of the untranslatable (the noli me 
tangere of the original) survive even in the contemporary fetishization of the 
untranslatable. Rather, as translators have known for a while now, it was 
the very separation of the untranslatable and the translatable that had to be 
liberated from its metaphysical ballast.7
Th is is why today the critique of the metaphysics of translation must 
proceed once again by way of the affirmation of the possibility of translation. 
Th e event of translation, however, will always insist not only on the mere 
possibility of translation, but also on the fact that we encounter singular 
successful acts of translation all around us. Relying on an old philosophical 
topos, we could compare this rare moment of truth to a constellation. Th ese 
acts of translation inhabit our lives the way the seemingly immobile stars of 
the evening sky suddenly brighten up for a moment in fleeting constellations 
before they disappear from the human eye, leaving behind nothing but the 
promise of their own infinity.
orn
n o t e s
 1. As Edwin Gentzler has observed, since the 1990s, we have witnessed a veritable 
“boom in translation theory” (2001, 187). As a result, it is impossible to name here 
all of the important figures of this development, but for representative titles of this 
political turn in translation studies, see Apter (2005), Bassnett and Lefevere (1990; 
1998), Berman and Wood (2005), Burrell and Kelly (1995), Cheyfitz (1997), Cronin 
(2003; 2006), Niranjana (1992), Spivak (2008), Tymoczko (1999), Tymoczko and 
Gentzler (2002), and Venuti (1992).
 2. Th e most important contemporary representative of this philosophy is Alain Badiou. 
For his discussions of truth, see his Being and Event (2005), Ethics (2001), and the 
chapter “Philosophy and Truth” in Infinite Th ought (2003).
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 3. For another attempt to connect the idea of parapraxis to translation, see Dennis 
Porter’s “Psychoanalysis and the Task of the Translator” (1991, 159). Porter’s Lacanian 
reading, however, does not exploit the possibilities of this insight in sufficient detail.
 4. More recent readers of Freud, however, tended to be less critical of Strachey’s 
translations. Lawrence Venuti, for example, in Th e Translator’s Invisibility, spoke 
up on behalf of the Standard Edition in more dialectical terms. Venuti proposes a 
“symptomatic reading” of the translation which is based on the assumption that “[n]
either the foreign writer nor the translator is conceived as the transcendental origin 
of the text” (2008, 24). Since Venuti defines translation in terms of the unavoidable 
interplay of “foreignization” and “domestication,” he claims, “It can be argued, 
therefore, that the inconsistent diction in the English translations does not really 
deserve to be judged erroneous; on the contrary, it discloses interpretive choices 
determined by a wide range of social institutions and cultural movements, some 
(like the specific institutionalization of psychoanalysis) calculated by the translators, 
others (like the dominance of positivism and the discontinuities in Freud’s texts) 
remaining dimly perceived or entirely unconscious during the translation process” 
(28).
 5. In other words, “translatability” and “untranslatability” are relational terms 
designating subjective or collective judgments concerning the relationship of two 
specific objects: the original and the translation. We could take as an example the 
question of the untranslatability of the Hegelian term Aufhebung. For the sake of the 
argument, let us accept the fact that Derrida’s French translation of Aufhebung with 
the verb relever was a “relevant” translation to the degree that it went against the 
philosophical doxa of the times according to which the Hegelian original was strictly 
speaking untranslatable (Derrida 2004, 441). Th us, Derrida’s act of translation asserted 
the “translatability” of the original by establishing a new set of relations between the 
original and the translation: its intervention consisted of instituting a new relation 
between Aufhebung and relever. At the same time, the common concern that the 
English “sublation” is at best a “ridiculous” translation of Aufhebung (Weber 1994, 
13) also calls attention to another problem: namely, that “untranslatability” is not 
necessarily the prerogative of the original, and that the original might be translatable 
into one target language but not another. Th us, the fundamentally relational nature of 
(un)translatability shows that neither the original nor the target language is the true 
location of this dubious determination.
 6. Th e point here is not at all to produce a “Badiouian” theory of translation. Rather, the 
task is to trace within the field of translation theory the potential eff ects and echoes 
of a general transformation that is taking place within the field of philosophy. To put 
it diff erently, our task is to investigate what it would mean for a theory of translation 
to be a contemporary of Badiou’s philosophy. We do not need to apply Badiou’s theory 
of truth to translation. We must examine the history of translation theory from the 
perspective of its own theories of truth. Th is examination, however, can be conceived 
as a contemporaneous response to something that happened outside the field of 
translation.
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 7. For a brief yet useful overview of the history of the untranslatable, see Hugo 
Friedrich’s essay “On Th e Art of Translation” (1992).
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